International Abitration by Smith, Steven et al.
International Arbitration
STEVEN SMrrT, IVANA CINGEL, BENJMUN JoNEs, KEVIN RuBINo, QAIs GHAFARY,
AND BRIAN CHANG*
This article surveys developments in international commercial arbitration during 2012.
I. Introduction
The first section of this survey examines significant decisions from U.S. courts in 2012
of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration. The
United States Supreme Court issued two per curiam decisions reinforcing the Federal
Arbitration Act's preemption of state law and one decision interpreting a statutory "right
to sue" provision to permit arbitration. There were also several noteworthy appellate
decisions interpreting the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp. and 2011 decision in AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion; the
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals under investment treaties; the availability of discovery in
aid of arbitration; the status of "manifest disregard of the law" as a ground for vacatur of
arbitral awards; and the assignment and enforcement of arbitration awards against foreign
sovereigns.
The second section of this survey examines significant arbitration decisions from for-
eign courts. In one noteworthy development, the High Court of Singapore upheld arbi-
tration awards rendered and sought to be enforced in Singapore, rejecting the argument
that the award debtors were authorized under the Singapore International Arbitration Act
to challenge the awards on jurisdictional grounds for the first time in enforcement pro-
ceedings long after the time limits for setting them aside had expired. In another note-
worthy development, the Supreme Court of India reversed a controversial decision that
permitted Indian courts to review and set aside foreign arbitral awards regardless of
whether the arbitration was seated in India or whether enforcement of the award was
sought in India.
The third section of this survey looks at major developments from 2012 in the field of
investment treaty arbitration. Important jurisdictional decisions addressed the denial of
substantive investment protections under the Dominican Republic-Central America
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Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) to an enterprise of a contracting party, and the applica-
tion of most-favored nation clauses to the dispute resolution provisions of an investment
treaty. In awards on the merits, tribunals addressed the minimum standard of treatment
required under CAFTA, the effect of a "minor breach" of the minimum standard of treat-
ment under an investment treaty, and in another case issued the largest known Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) award under a bilateral
investment treaty, over a strong dissent. One tribunal also addressed the effect of an in-
vestor's waiver of its contractual right to damages on its ability to recover for the host
state's purported breach of an investment treaty obligation.
II. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts Concerning the Interpretation
and Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses
A. FAA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
Reaffirming well-established precedent, the United States Supreme Court held in Mar-
met Health Care Center v. Brown that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state laws
prohibiting arbitration of particular types of claims.' The Court reversed a decision of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals holding that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
nursing home admission agreements that apply to claims for personal injury or wrongful
death are unenforceable as a matter of state public policy. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals had found that Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to these
types of claims and preempt state public policy and that the United States Supreme Court
"[w]ith tendentious reasoning . . . has stretched the application of the FAA from being a
procedural statutory scheme effective only in the federal courts, to being a substantive law
that preempts state law in both the federal and state courts." 2 The Supreme Court re-
jected this view, holding that the "West Virginia court's interpretation of the FAA was
both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of this Court," and
remanded the case for consideration of whether the arbitration clause is unenforceable on
non-arbitration-specific grounds. 3
In Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court that declared a noncompetition clause in an employment
contract containing an arbitration clause void and unenforceable under Oklahoma public
policy. 4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court had rejected the argument that pursuant to the
FAA and Supreme Court jurisprudence, any dispute as to the validity of the underlying
contract was a question for the arbitrator, and held that its decision rested on adequate
and independent state grounds.s The Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's reasoning had "ignored a basic tenet of the [FAA's] substantive arbitration law" 6
and observed that "it is a mainstay of the [FAA's] substantive law that attacks on the valid-
ity of the contract, as distinct from attacks on the validity of the arbitration clause itself,
1. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012).
2. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278, 293 (W. Va. 2011).
3. Marmet, 132 S. Ct. at 1203-04.





are to be resolved 'by the arbitrator in the first instance, not by a federal or state court.' "7
Citing Marmet, the Supreme Court concluded that "it is for the arbitrator to determine in
the first instance whether the covenants not to compete are valid as a matter of applicable
state law."8
B. ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
In a decision reinforcing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, the
United States Supreme Court held in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood that "right to sue"
language contained in the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA)9 did not preclude the
parties to a consumer financial contract from choosing to arbitrate rather than litigate
their CROA claims.10 CROA mandates that credit repair organizations make certain dis-
closures prior to executing consumer contracts, including the disclosure that the consum-
ers "have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates [CROA]."iI CROA also
contains a non-waiver provision stating that "[a]ny waiver by any consumer of any protec-
tion provided by or any right of the consumer under this subchapter-(1) shall be treated
as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person."' 2
The Ninth Circuit held that the "right to sue" language created a right to initial judicial
enforcement, and given CROA's non-waiver provision, consumers could not waive via an
arbitration agreement.' 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that CROA's disclosure
provision only required consumers to receive the disclosure set forth in the statute and did
not prevent arbitration.14 The Court observed that it is "utterly commonplace for statutes
that create civil causes of action to describe the details of those causes of action, including
the relief available, in the context of a court suit," and concluded that the parties to a
credit repair contract were free to specify the details of the right of enforcement, provided
that CROA's guarantee of the consumer's right to impose liability upon a credit repair
organization was preserved.IS The Court observed that arbitration agreements were al-
ready in wide use in consumer financial contracts at the time of CROA's enactment and
contrasted CROA against several statutes that explicitly restricted the arbitration of fed-
eral rights created by the statute.16
C. DECISIONS ON CLASS ARBITRATION INTERPRETING STOLT-NTELSEN
Several recent circuit court decisions have interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. that a party cannot be forced "to sub-
mit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party
7. Id. at 503 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008)).
8. Id. at 504.
9. Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679-1679j (2006).
10. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012); see also Ekaterina Apos-
tolova & Benjamin Jones, CompuCredit: Pro-Arbitration Policy Continued, [Feb. 20121 27 Mealey's Int'l Arb.
Rep. No. 2, at 14 (Feb. 28, 2012).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006).
12. Id. § 1679f(a).
13. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010).
14. CompuCredit Carp., 132 S. Ct. at 670.
15. Id. at 670-71.
16. Id. at 672-73.
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agreed to do so."17 The First, Second, and Third Circuits relied on the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment in Stolt-Nielsen that parties could "implicitly authorize" class arbitration,
and used very similar reasoning to affirm decisions that allowed class arbitrations based on
clauses that did not expressly mention class arbitration.'8 Each circuit's decision stressed
that, unlike Stolt-Nielsen where the parties had "stipulated" that they had not reached
agreement contractually permitting class arbitration, the parties before them disagreed
about whether they had reached agreement on the permissibility of class arbitration.19 All
three circuits concluded that where the parties dispute whether they had agreed on class
arbitration, that dispute is for the arbitrator to decide as a matter of traditional contract
interpretation. 20 The Third Circuit also reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen "did not establish a
bright line rule that class arbitration is allowed only under an arbitration agreement that
incants 'class arbitration' or otherwise expressly provides for aggregate procedures." 21
In a recent decision addressing the same issue, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the First,
Second, and Third Circuits that the question of whether the parties had agreed to class
arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide, but held that the arbitrator had exceeded its
authority under Stolt-Nielsen by determining that the parties agreed to class arbitration in
the absence of any reference to class arbitration in their agreement.22 The agreement at
issue called for arbitration of "any dispute" between the parties and granted the arbitrator
the power to grant "any remedy" without mentioning class arbitration. 23 The Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that such a clause "could support a finding that the parties did not preclude
class arbitration, but under Stolt-Nielsen this is not enough."24
D. DECISIONS ON CLASs ARBITRATION INTERPRETING AT&T MoBILrrY LLC
In 2011, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in AT&TMobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, holding that the FAA preempted a California state law rule that class action waiv-
ers in certain consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable, and established that
such waivers are enforceable even if they would be unconscionable under the applicable
state law.25 In finding the California rule preempted by the FAA, the Supreme Court
observed that section two of the FAA allows arbitration provisions to be "declared unen-
forceable 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract,'" including unconscionability, but not by "defenses that apply only to arbitration or
that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue."26 Sev-
eral recent circuit court decisions have addressed the arbitrability of federal and state stat-
utory claims in light of Concepcion.
17. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
18. Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2012); Jock v. Sterling
Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2011); Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 225 (3d
Cir. 2012).
19. Fantastic Sans Franchise Corp., 683 F.3d at 23; Jock, 646 F.3d at 121, 124; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 224.
20. Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp., 683 F.3d at 22-23; Jock, 646 F.3d at 121, 125-27; Sutter, 675 F.3d at
222-24.
21. Sutter, 675 F.3d at 222.
22. Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 642 (5th Cir. 2012).
23. Id. at 642-43.
24. Id. at 644.
25. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011).
26. Id. at 1746-47 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
VOL. 47
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119
In In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, the Second Circuit held that an arbitra-
tion clause in a merchant card acceptance agreement that would force merchants to indi-
vidually arbitrate their antitrust claims against American Express was unenforceable where
it would have the practical effect of precluding plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory
rights.27 The Second Circuit relied heavily on expert testimony that the costs of expert
analysis needed to support plaintiffs' antitrust claims would far exceed the plaintiffs' po-
tential individual recovery, effectively preventing them from vindicating their rights in
individual arbitrations. 28 The court observed it could not order the parties to submit to
class arbitration in light of Concepcion, and concluded that the arbitration clause was unen-
forceable altogether. 29 The Second Circuit denied an en banc rehearing of its decision,
despite vigorous dissents from three Second Circuit judges.30 The ruling stands in con-
trast to the Ninth Circuit ruling in Coneffv. AT&T Corp., where the court enforced a class
action waiver even though the waiver, as a practical matter, precluded the individual plain-
tiff from vindicating her federal statutory rights.3 '
With respect to state law claims, the Ninth Circuit held in Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A. that,
in light of Concepcion, the FAA preempted a California state law prohibiting arbitration of
claims for broad public injunctive relief.32 The court held that the California law "did not
survive Concepcion" because it "prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of
claim-claims for broad public injunctive relief."33 The Ninth Circuit then rejected the
argument that the arbitration clause at issue was procedurally unconscionable, observing
that the clause provided "a 60-day opt-out provision and a conspicuous and comprehen-
sive explanation of the arbitration agreement." 34 The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition
for en banc rehearing in Kilgore.
M. Availability of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration - 28 U.S.C. § 1782
In In re Consorcio Ecautoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., the Eleventh Circuit declined to
follow the holdings of the Second and Fifth Circuits that 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which autho-
rizes district courts to compel discovery "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or interna-
tional tribunal," does not permit discovery for use in a foreign, private commercial
arbitration. 3 The Eleventh Circuit held that the tribunal in an international commercial
arbitration pending in Ecuador before the Center for Arbitration and Conciliation of the
Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce constituted a "foreign tribunal" for purposes of section
1782.36 After observing that "[t]he arbitral panel acts as a first-instance decisionmaker; it
27. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (11th Cit. 2012).
28. Id. at 217-18.
29. Id. at 219.
30. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
31. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).
32. Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 964.
35. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cit. 1999) (refusing to grant discov-
ery assistance to an ICC arbitration seated in Mexico); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d
880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to grant assistance under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to an international commercial
arbitration pending before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce).
36. In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987, 990 (11th Cit. 2012).
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permits the gathering and submission of evidence; it resolves the dispute; it issues a bind-
ing order; and its order is subject to judicial review," the court ruled that section 1782
"requires nothing more.">3 Similarly, in In re Mesa Power Group, LLC, a federal district
court in the eleventh circuit applied factors articulated by Consorcio, and concluded that a
NAFTA arbitration tribunal constituted a foreign or international tribunal,38 and author-
ized a U.S.-based investor to take discovery against a third-party company for use in a
NAFTA arbitration against the Government of Canada.39
IV. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
A. STATUS OF "MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW" FOLLOWING HALL STREET
Another open question involves whether judicially created grounds not expressly set
forth in the FAA-including manifest disregard of the law and complete irrationality-
continue to be valid grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards following the Supreme Court's
2008 decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.40 The answer will likely depend on
whether "manifest disregard" and "complete irrationality" are deemed extra-statutory
grounds for vacatur-which would call their viability into doubt-or whether they instead
refer collectively to the grounds set forth in section ten of the FAA, or are merely short-
hand for, or a gloss on, FAA sections 10(a)(3)-(4), which authorize vacatur when the arbi-
trators are "guilty of misconduct" or "exceed[] their powers." The Supreme Court has
declined to resolve this issue, and circuit courts remain divided.
The Second Circuit previously affirmed the continued viability of "manifest disregard"
on the statutory "shorthand" theory, indicating that this standard is a "judicial gloss on the
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section ten of the FAA."41 But that decision
was reversed and remanded on unrelated grounds by the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.42 The Second Circuit resolved the question in
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Bayou
Group, L.P., finding that even after Hall Street, manifest disregard remains a valid basis for
vacatur. 43 Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the manifest disregard standard is
"highly deferential" to arbitrators and affirmed the district court's refusal to overturn the
arbitral award.44
37. Id.
38. In re Mesa Power Grp., LLC, No. 11-24335, 2012 WL 2886827, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2012).
39. Id. at *8.
40. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
41. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
42. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777.
43. Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Bayou Grp.,
L.L.C., Nos. 10-5049-cv (Lead), I1-2446-cv (XAP), 2012 WL 2548927, at *1 (2d Cir. July 3, 2012); see also
T.Co Metals, L.L.C. v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339-40 (2d Cir. 2010) (acknowledging
Stolt-Nielsen's findings on manifest disregard and noting that Hall Street had placed the standard into some
doubt, but leaving the issue unresolved by concluding that the manifest disregard standard had not been met).
44. Goldman Sacbs, 2012 WL 2548927, at *1, *5.
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This year, the Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth45 and Sixth46 Circuits in finding that
"manifest disregard" remains a viable ground for vacatur. 47 The Tenth Circuit"8 found
that the standard had not been satisfied in various cases without squarely deciding its
continued viability. In contrast, the Fifth,49 Eighthso and Elevenths' Circuits have held
that manifest disregard is no longer a viable ground. The First Circuit stated in dicta in
one opinion that Hall Street abolished "manifest disregard," but in a subsequent opinion
vacated an award based on the manifest disregard standard without discussing Hall
Street.52 The Third Circuit has declined to reach the issue. 5 3
B. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS AGAINST FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The Second Circuit issued two recent decisions that may have significant implications
for award creditors seeking to enforce arbitral awards against foreign sovereigns. In
Figuei-ido Ferraz e Engenharia de Proeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, the Second Circuit, in a
controversial decision, blocked enforcement of an international arbitral award on forum
non conveniens (FNC) grounds.s4 The Second Circuit held that Peru's cap statute, which
limits the amount of money a Peruvian governmental entity may pay annually to satisfy a
judgment, was a "significant public factor" that "tips the FNC balance decisively against
the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States."55 While the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged that enforcement of arbitral awards "is normally a favored policy of the United
States and is specifically contemplated by the Panama Convention, that general policy
must give way to the significant public factor of Peru's cap statute."5 6
In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit affirmed an order "compelling
two non-party banks to comply with subpoenas duces tecum seeking information" regard-
ing Argentina's assets abroad.57 Argentina argued that the discovery order violated the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by compelling disclosure of Argentinian assets
abroad.5 8 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the discovery order
45. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Johnson v. Wells
Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 414 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2011); Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 607 F.3d 634, 641 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2010).
46. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008).
47. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C. v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 480 (4th Cir. 2012).
48. Abbott v. Law Office of PatrickJ. Mulligan, 440 F. App'x 612, 620 (10th Cir. 2011); DMA Int'l, Inc. v.
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2009).
49. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009).
50. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Trans States Airlines, L.L.C., 638 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2011); Med.
Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010).
51. White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v. Glawson Invs. Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011);
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).
52. Compare Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2008), with Kashner
Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008), and Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz,
601 F.3d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 2010).
53. See, e.g., Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, L.L.C. v. Smith, 389 F. App'x 172, 175-77 (3d
Cir. 2010).
54. Figueiredo Ferraz e Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2011).
55. Id. at 392.
56. Id.
57. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012).
58. Id. at 205.
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did not infringe sovereign immunity where it did not involve the attachment of sovereign
property and was directed at third-party banks rather than Argentina itself.59 The Second
Circuit expressly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's prior decision in Rubin v. Islamic
Republic ofIran, which held "that the FSIA requires a judgment creditor to identify specific
non-immune assets before it is entitled" to discovery regarding those assets.60
In Blue Ridge Investments, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, the Southern District of New
York addressed the question of assignability of ICSID awards and the time period within
which the assignee must enforce the award. The court held that "nothing in the ICSID
Convention, in Congress's legislation implementing ICSID, or in New York law prevents
an assignee from seeking recognition and enforcement of an ICSID Convention award." 6,
The court rejected Argentina's argument that the assignee's petition was "time-barred
under New York's one-year statute of limitations for lawsuits seeking confirmation of an
arbitration award," 62 finding that, "[b]ecause ICSID awards are to be treated as final judg-
ments of a state court-rather than as arbitration awards-the most analogous state stat-
ute of limitations" was the 20-year statute of limitations for the enforcement of out-of-
state money judgments. 63 The assignee's enforcement petition was thus timely filed.M
C. PROPER FORUM FOR ARBITRAB=.Y DETERMINATIONS
Under well-established precedent, the intent of the contracting parties controls whether
the question of "arbitrability" is properly addressed by a court or an arbitrator. In 2012,
two circuit courts considered this standard and arrived at divergent conclusions.
Applying the rule that "arbitrability" is a question for the courts to decide absent "clear
and unmistakable" evidence that the contracting parties had "agreed to arbitrate arbi-
trability," the D.C. Circuit in Argentina v. BG Group held that a tribunal established under
the Argentina-United Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) exceeded its authority
by finding the parties' dispute arbitrable and thus vacated its award.65 Because the inves-
tor invoked the BIT's arbitration clause without first seeking recourse in Argentine courts
for the eighteen-month period required by the BIT, the D.C. Circuit held that the arbitral
tribunal's authority to decide questions of "arbitrability" enshrined in the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules governing the arbitration never "triggered." 66 The court found the BIT
provision mandating recourse to Argentine courts explicit and observed that the question
of "arbitrability," namely whether a British investor could seek arbitration without first
turning to Argentinian courts, was one "the parties would likely have expected a court to
59. Id.
60. Id. at 209; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2011).
61. Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 10 Civ. 153(PGG), 2012 WIL 4714819, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012).
62. Id. at *15.
63. Id. at *17-18.
64. Id.
65. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1365-66, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
66. Id. at 1366, 1370-71 (citing Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K.,
Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 33, art. 8(1)-(2)).
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decide." 67 The investor has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the United States
Supreme Court to decide whether a court or an arbitrator should determine whether a
precondition to arbitration has been satisfied.68 Several amici, including a group of prom-
inent professors and practitioners, have supported the petition.69
Meanwhile, in Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, the Second Circuit held that the ques-
tion of arbitrability turns on whether "there was clear and unmistakable evidence of the
parties' intent to commit that question to arbitration," not, as the lower court had indi-
cated, "on whether that question was one of [contract] scope or formation,"70 and affirmed
an arbitration award against Thailand.7' A Germany-Thailand BIT provided that dis-
putes concerning "approved investments" were subject to arbitration, 72 and the parties
agreed in the Terms of Reference to use the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, including
Article 21, which grants an arbitral tribunal "the power to rule on objections that it has no
jurisdiction." 73 Relying on Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., where the Second Circuit
held that a BIT's incorporation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules was "'clear and
unmistakable evidence' that the parties intended [questions of arbitrability] to be decided
by the arbitral panel in the first instance," the Second Circuit held that the parties' incor-
poration of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules via the Terms of Reference similarly consti-
tuted "clear and unmistakable evidence of [the parties'] intent to arbitrate issues of
arbitrability," including whether the project involved "approved investments."7 4
V. Arbitration Developments in Foreign Courts
The High Court of Singapore issued an important decision rejecting a jurisdictional
challenge to awards rendered in Singapore, finding that the Singapore International Arbi-
tration Act, unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, did not permit such a challenge in a proceeding to enforce the awards in the
rendering jurisdiction. In Astro Nusantara International BVv. PTAyunda Prima Mitra, the
High Court upheld two "domestic international awards"7 s that were challenged on juris-
dictional grounds for the first time by the Indonesian award debtors during enforcement
proceedings only after the award creditors secured court judgments and enforcement or-
ders and the period for applying to set aside the awards had expired. 76 The High Court
67. Id. at 1371 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
68. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 665 F.3d 1363 (2012) (No.
12-138), 2012 WL 3091067, at *1.
69. See Brief for Professors and Practitioners of Arbitration Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
9-10, BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 665 F.3d 1363 (2012) (No. 12-138), 2012 WL 3805768.
70. Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2012).
71. Id. at 74.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 72-73 (citing GA Res. 65/22, art. 21, T[ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/465 (Apr. 2011)).
74. Id. at 73 (citing Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 394 (2d Cir. 2011)).
75. Astro Nusantara Int'l BV v. PT Ayunda Prima Mitra, [2012] SGHC 212, at [1] (Oct. 22, 2012) (Sing.).
The term "domestic international awards" as used by the High Court refers to an "international commercial
arbitral award ... made in the same territory as the forum in which recognition and enforcement is sought."
Id. Such an award is referred to as a "non-domestic" award in U.S. case law.
76. Id. at [7]-[9].
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held that no grounds existed for challenging the awards under those circumstances,77 and
specifically rejected the debtors' attempt to invoke article thirty-six of the Model Law,
which enumerates certain grounds for the refusal of recognition or enforcement regard-
less of the country in which the award was made.78 The High Court reasoned that the
Singapore International Arbitration Act draws a clear distinction between domestic inter-
national awards and foreign awards and, in any event, expressly excludes Article 36 of the
Model Law. 79
The Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark decision reversing its controversial
decision in Bbatia International v. Bulk Trading SA,so paving the way for reduced court
intervention in arbitrations seated outside of India. In Bhatia International, the court in-
terpreted the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 to allow for Part I of the Act
(which provided for remedies such as awarding interim relief and setting aside of arbitral
awards) to be applied even to arbitrations seated outside of India. After extensive criticism
of Bhatia International, the court overruled that decision this year in Bharat Aluminium Co.
v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service, Inc.,8 1 holding that Part I of the Act only applies to
arbitrations seated within India and that awards rendered in arbitrations seated abroad are
only subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts when enforcement is sought in India. The
decision in Bharat Aluminium, however, only applies to arbitration agreements entered
into after September 6, 2012, suggesting that the legacy of Bhatia International will be
relevant for some time to come.
VI. Jurisdiction of Investor-State Disputes
A. ENFORCEMENT OF "DENIAL OF BENEFITS" PROVISION
In 2012, an arbitral tribunal interpreted for the first time the "denial of benefits" provi-
sion under CAFTA and did so seemingly without analyzing other tribunals' interpreta-
tions of similar provisions under other investment treaties.82 In Pac Rim Cayman LLC v.
Republic of El Salvador, a tribunal constituted under CAFTA held that it lacked jurisdiction
over claims asserted by a claimant enterprise83 against El Salvador pursuant to Article
10.12.2 of CAFTA, which permits a CAFTA party to deny the claimant enterprise the
benefits conferred by CAFTA if "the [claimant] enterprise has no substantial business ac-
tivities in the territory of any Party, other than the denying Party" and "persons of a non-
Party, or of the denying Party own or control the enterprise." 84 The tribunal determined
that El Salvador, as the denying party, was required to demonstrate two conditions in
77. Id. at [73].
78. Id. at (100].
79. Id. at [111].
80. Bhatia Int'l v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002) 2001 S.C.R. 6257 (India).
81. Bharat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Serv., Inc., (2012) 2005 S.C.R. 7019 (India).
82. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the
Respondent's Jurisdictional Objections, [ 4.3 (June 1, 2012). Article 10.12.2 of CAFTA permits a contracting
party to deny the treaty's investment protections to an enterprise of another party if the enterprise has no
"substantial business activities" in the territory of any contracting party other than the denying party, and if it
is owned or controlled by persons of a non-party or the denying party. Id.
83. While the enterprise was located in the United States, a party to CAFTA, it was wholly owned by a
parent company located in Canada, a non-party to CAFTA. Id. 1 4.81.
84. Id. 1 4.92.
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order to benefit from this Article: (1) that the claimant enterprise had no substantial busi-
ness activities in the territory of a CAFTA party (beyond mere form), and (2) that the
claimant was either owned or controlled by persons of a non-CAFTA party.85 Applying
this standard, the tribunal determined that El Salvador was entitled to deny the benefits of
CAFTA's investment protections to the claimant enterprise because it was "akin to a shell
company with no geographic location"8 6 and was wholly owned by a Canadian corpora-
tion.87 Despite finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the enterprise's claims brought
under CAFTA, the tribunal nevertheless exercised jurisdiction over claims brought under
El Salvador's Investment Law, which the tribunal held to constitute a separate form of
consent by El Salvador to ICSID jurisdiction.88
B. APPLICATION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION (MFN) CLAUSES To DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROVISIONS
In Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, an ICSID tribunal split on the
question of the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute resolution clauses. The majority,
which included Professors Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Domingo Bello Janeiro, held that it
lacked jurisdiction over the German investor's claims, including those brought under the
MFN clauses of the Germany-Argentina BIT, where the claimant had failed to fulfill the
treaty's condition precedent to arbitration-eighteen months of domestic litigation in the
courts of Argentina.89 The majority first "require[d] affirmative evidence" of the host
state's consent to arbitration, such as an express declaration of consent or acts "conclu-
sively establishing" such consent.90 Accordingly, the majority sought to determine
whether the parties to the BIT had intended to submit to ICSID jurisdiction where the
investor had not fully complied with the investor-state dispute resolution process laid
down in the BIT.91 The majority observed that the BIT contained multiple MFN clauses,
with Article 3(1) of the BIT guaranteeing MFN treatment to qualifying investments,
while Articles 3(2) and 4(4) guaranteed MFN treatment to qualifying investors "with re-
spect to their activities in connection with investments." 92 The majority considered the
parties' understanding of the word "treatment" in the BIT's MFN clauses, concluding
that the parties maintained a distinction between the host State's "direct treatment of
investments within its territory and the international settlement of investor-State
disputes." 93
The tribunal majority rejected the investor's argument that the dispute resolution pro-
visions of the BIT were less favorable than those of a comparable Argentina-Chile BIT.
While the majority observed that the two BITs provided different "procedural route[s]" to
85. Id. 1 4.61.
86. Id. T 4.75.
87. Having found that the claimant enterprise was wholly owned by a non-party, the Tribunal found it
unnecessary to consider the question of control. Id. 1 4.82.
88. Id. 11 5.39, 5.48.
89. Daimler Fin. Sers. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 9 281 (Aug. 22,
2012).
90. Id. 1 175.
91. Id. 9 177.
92. Id. 1 232.
93. Id. 1 236.
SPRING 2013
126 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
dispute resolution, it held that the provisions of one BIT were not "objectively more
favorable" than the other.94 The tribunal majority also reviewed the practice of interna-
tional arbitration tribunals and states, concluding that no opinio juris yet existed among
arbitrators regarding the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute resolution provisions,
and that the treaty practices of Germany, Argentina, and other states "converge in signal-
ing that the specified MFN clauses do not, and were never intended to, reach the interna-
tional dispute resolution provisions of the [relevant] investment agreements." 95
In a dissent, Judge Charles N. Brower strongly criticized the Daimler majority's analysis
of the treaty's MFN clause, describing it as "not simply unconvincing" but also "pro-
foundly wrong." 96 Judge Brower rejected the majority's holding that "affirmative evi-
dence" is required to demonstrate state consent to arbitration despite the state's execution
and ratification of the treaty, arguing that the majority's position "finds no basis in the
cases, in logic, or in any source of international law."97 Similarly, Judge Brower rejected
the majority's characterization of the Argentina-Chile BIT as different but not more
favorable than the Germany-Argentina BIT, arguing that the provision in the Argentina-
Chile BIT "offering an investor a choice [of domestic litigation versus arbitration] is in-
herently more favorable" than the provision in the Germany-Argentina BIT, which re-
quired the investor to pursue domestic litigation for eighteen months before initiating
arbitration. 98
VII. Decisions on the Merits and Quantum
A. BREACH OF THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT
In Railroad Development Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala (RDC), an ICSID tribunal consti-
tuted under CAFTA held that Guatemala breached the treaty's minimum standard of
treatment where it revoked the investor's railway usufruct contract pursuant to a lesivo
procedure, by which it determined that the contract had been unlawfully issued and was
harmful to the state's interests without providing the investor any opportunity to be
heard. 99 The RDC tribunal was highly critical of the lesivo procedure, observing that "un-
less such an extraordinary remedy is used in truly exceptional circumstances ... it creates
situations which have the potential to violate the minimum standard of treatment of aliens
under customary international law."oo In a holding that may have significant implications
for subsequent claims brought under CAFTA, the tribunal endorsed the minimum stan-
dard of treatment articulated in Waste Management v. United Mexican States, holding that
this standard "persuasively integrates the accumulated analysis of prior NAFTA Tribunals
94. Id. 1 250.
95. Id. 1 276; see also Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction Gan. 25,
2000).
96. Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Dissenting Opinion of
Charles N. Brower, 38 (Dec. 27, 2012).
97. Id. T 11.
98. Id. T 36 (citing Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3 1, Decision onJurisdic-
tion, 1 96 (Oct. 24, 2011)).
99. R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, T 235 Gune 29, 2012)
[hereinafter RDC].
100. Id. 9 233.
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and reflects a balanced description of the minimum standard of treatment."' 0 While the
RDC tribunal awarded the investor damages for its losses, it conditioned the payment of
the award on the investor's relinquishment of its rights under its contracts with
Guatemala.I 0 2
In Swisslion DOO Skopie v. Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, an ICSID tribunal held
Macedonia liable for a "minor breach" of the fair and equitable treatment standard of the
Switzerland-Macedonia BIT, on the basis of "a series of measures that collectively amount
to a composite act." 0 3 Although the investor's claims focused on the Macedonian judicial
proceeding in which its investment contract was terminated and a portion of its equity
investment in a Macedonian enterprise transferred to Macedonia's Ministry of Economy,
the Swisslion tribunal held that the judicial proceeding did not violate international law,
observing that the investor "was unable to point to any serious procedural unfairness in
the conduct of the legal proceedings . . . [or] evidence of a lack of judicial independence or
other judicial misconduct."' 0 4 Rather, the tribunal concluded that a treaty breach arose
from measures by state agencies "taken prior to or on the margins of the contractual
litigation," including the Ministry of Economy's failure to timely respond to the investor's
inquiries and its prolonged consideration of whether the investor was acting in compliance
with its investment contract, as well as certain administrative actions taken by Macedonian
securities regulators and the publication of information relating to a criminal investigation
of the investor. 05 The tribunal determined that the minor nature of the breach "necessa-
rily leads to a substantial reduction in the amount of damages that can be awarded," and
awarded damages for the legal costs the investor incurred contesting the securities regula-
tion and criminal investigation measures, the diversion of its management's time in re-
sponding to heightened controls imposed by the Ministry of Economy, and an allocation
of lost sales resulting from the investor's reputational damage.' 06
B. EXPROPRIATION
In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, an ICSID tribunal held Ecuador
liable for its expropriation of the investor's oil rights in the Amazon, in violation of the
U.S.-Ecuador BIT and Ecuadorian and international law, and issued the largest known
ICSID award under a bilateral investment treaty, totaling nearly US $1.8 billion. 07 The
tribunal held that Ecuador's caducidad decree, which terminated the investor's participa-
tion agreement for the exploration and exploitation of an area of the Ecuadorian Ama-
101. Id. 1219 (quoting Waste Mgmt. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award,
98 (Apr. 30, 2004) (holding that the minimum standard of treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to
the state that is "arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to
sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety .. . .").
102. RDC, supra note 99, 9 267.
103. Swisslion DOO Skopje v. Forsner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16,
Award, 1 275 (July 6, 2012).
104. Id. 91 268.
105. Id. 9 276, 337.
106. Id. 11337, 350.
107. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 1825 (Oct.
5, 2012).
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zon10 in response to the investor's unauthorized transfer of its participation rights to
another oil company, violated the principle of proportionality under Ecuadorian and in-
ternational law and constituted a measure "tantamount to expropriation" and thus a
breach of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.109 Although the investor had transferred 40 percent of
its participation rights to another oil company via a transfer agreement, the majority pro-
ceeded to calculate the investor's damages on the basis of 100 percent of its participation
rights, treating the transfer as "inexistent" or an "absolute nullity" for purposes of deter-
mining damages. 10 Nonetheless, the tribunal concluded that the investor was partially at
fault for having failed to seek authorization from Ecuador prior to executing the transfer
agreement, and consequently reduced the investor's damages award by 25 percent."'1
Professor Brigitte Stern joined the majority decision as to liability but dissented as to
the calculation of damages, which she characterized as "resting on grossly incorrect legal
bases."'12 Professor Stern argued that the tribunal "overly underestimated" the investor's
contribution to the harm it suffered, observing that a "fair and reasonable apportionment
of responsibility . . . should more appropriately have been a 50/50 split."II3 Moreover,
Professor Stern argued that the transfer agreement remained in force and binding under
both New York and Ecuadorian law even after the caducidad decree was issued,"l 4 and that
the majority erred by treating it as "inexistent" for purposes of calculating damages.115
Accordingly, Professor Stern argued that the tribunal should only have awarded the inves-
tor damages corresponding to its 60 percent participation right and that such an award
would satisfy the international law principle of full recovery.116
C. EFFECT OF WAIVER OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DAMAGES ON RECOVERABILITY
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF A TREATY OBLIGATION
In Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, an ICSID tribunal held that
the investor's waiver of its contractual right to damages for project delays prevented the
investor from later seeking the same damages under the Italy-Lebanon BIT."17 The tri-
bunal observed that "when it concerns the same damage for the same act, compensation
that a Claimant has waived under the Contract cannot be recovered under the Treaty.""1s
The tribunal also rejected the investor's claims for damages on the independent ground
that the investor had no legitimate expectations that the state would provide the investor
with parcels of land on which to construct the project without delay."' 9
108. Id. 2.
109. Id. 1 452-55.
110. Id. 1 634, 655-56.
111. Id. %9 686-87.
112. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 1, Dissenting Opinion
of Professor Brigitte Stem, I 1 (Oct. 5, 2012).
113. Id. 1 8.
114. Id. 1155, 113.
115. Id. 11 40, 116.
116. Id. 144, 154-57 (citing Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 31 (Sept.
13)).
117. Toto Construzioni Generali SPA. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 1 85
Gune 7, 2012).
118. Id.
119. Id. 1 191.
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